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top-down funding of the CAP seems to be able to concentrate some benefits in the most 
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The EU Cohesion policy in context: regional 
growth and the influence of agricultural and 
rural development policies 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The aim of the EU Regional Policy is to reduce disparities in economic 
development, employment and opportunities between the most advanced 
and the most disadvantaged areas of the Union (Art. 158 of the Treaty of the 
European Union). In its current form, this policy is not only aimed at inter-
regional income redistribution but also at creating the basis for long-term 
sustainable development in the most disadvantaged areas (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Fratesi, 2004). In terms of financial allocation, the resources devoted by 
the Union to territorial cohesion have more than doubled since 1975. The EU 
Cohesion   Policy   alone   accounts   for   roughly   1/3   of   the   EU’s   total   budgetary  
resources for the 2014-2020 programming period.  
 
Despite   the   political   emphasis   placed   on   the   ‘territorial   cohesion’   objective,  
and the substantial amount of financial resources devoted to the EU Regional 
Policy, there is no consensus on its impact.  Territorial disparities within the 
EU remain significantly higher than within the United States (Farole, 
Rodríguez-Pose, Storper, 2009; 6th Cohesion Report, European Commission, 
2014). The   EU   is   characterized   by   “increasing   economic   integration   among  
nation-states   with   relatively   similar   levels   of   development”   coupled   with  
“different   social,   institutional,   and   technological   features   in   regions”   (Barca,  
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McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012, p. 143).  The existing literature has 
identified a variety of factors that can influence the overall impact of the EU 
Cohesion policy and possibly explain its success and failures. However, very 
limited attention has been paid so far to the interaction between the EU 
regional policy and other EU policies that absorb large part of the residual 
share  of  the  EU  budget.  The  EU  Regional  Policy  is  a  ‘spatially  targeted’  policy:  
eligibility and funding are granted on the basis of geographical criteria and its 
outcomes are also assessed in terms of the performance of well-defined spatial 
units (administrative regions). The EU Rural Development Policy is also  
‘spatially  targeted’  although  its  targets  are  defined  in  terms  of  a  combination  
of geographical, sectoral and socio-economic   attributes   that   define   ‘rural  
areas’.  Finally,  while  some  policies  can  be  considered  ‘space  neutral’  in  terms  
of both their intent and outcomes (e.g. competition policies) others, albeit 
neutral in their intent exhibit a considerable spatial impact: this is the case of 
the Common Agricultural Policy.  As a consequence the EU Cohesion Policy 
does not operate in a vacuum but it interacts at the territorial level with other 
EU policies that – intentionally or unintentionally - might magnify or curb its 
influence  on  regional  economic  performance.  In  this  sense,  the  ‘New  Regional  
Policy’   paradigm   (OECD,   2009)   advocates   that   all   European   policies,  
irrespective  of  whether  they  are  ‘spatially  targeted’  or  ‘spatially  blind’  (Duhr  
et al, 2010) should support   territorial   cohesion   and   promote   growth   in   ‘all  
regions’   (including  economically  disadvantaged  areas)  by  means  of  a   ‘place-
based’  approach. 
 
In order to situate the EU Regional Policy in a broader EU policy framework, 
this paper aims to answer the following research questions: how do other EU 
policies shape the link between the EU Cohesion policy and territorial 
cohesion?; what can we learn from other EU Policies in order to reinforce 
territorial cohesion? The answers come from the analysis of the link between 
The EU Cohesion policy in context 
3   
Regional Growth and all key EU policies: Regional Policy, Rural Development 
Policy (RDP) and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), accounting for almost 
90% of total EU spending.  The relative importance of the various policies and 
the nature of their interactions are assessed by means of a panel data regional 
growth analysis covering all the regions of the European Union. The analysis 
is based on a dataset that includes information on regional GDP growth, 
economic and socio-economic conditions and regional-level expenditure for 
EU Regional Policy, Rural Development and the CAP.  
 
The paper makes an innovative contribution to the existing literature by 
looking   for   the   first   time   at   all   ‘spatially   targeted’   and   ‘spatially-blind with 
territorial  impacts’ EU policies in the same framework, accounting for almost 
90% of total EU expenditure over three budget cycles. The in-depth analysis 
of the interactions between different policy areas in a territorial perspective is 
also innovative: disciplinary boundaries have often prevented the cross-
fertilisation of regional, rural and agricultural issues. In so doing the paper 
unveils a number of new challenges for European cohesion. 
 
The empirical results – robust to a large number of checks - show that the EU 
Regional Policy has a positive and significant influence on economic growth 
in all regions. However, is also suggests that its impact is stronger in the most 
socio-economically advanced regions and is maximised when its expenditure 
is complemented by Rural Development and Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) funds. The top-down funding of the CAP seems to be able to 
concentrate some benefits in the most deprived areas.  Conversely only the 
most dynamics rural areas are capable of leveraging on the bottom-up 
measures of the EU Rural Development Policy. This suggests that EU policy 
makers in all fields should constantly look for the best mix of bottom-up and 
top-down measures in order to tackle structural disadvantage. 
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2.  Existing evidence and gaps   
There is a consensus in the economic literature that the analysis of the 
relationship between the EU Regional Policy and economic performance 
needs to consider a broad set of conditioning factors and different 
contributions have focused their attention upon a very heterogeneous set of 
territorial characteristics. 
 
The   most   relevant   territorial   factors   conditioning   the   policy’s   impact   are  
institutional and structural. With respect to the institutional elements, the EU 
Regional Policy impact is positively influenced by the degree of 
decentralization in the countries in which it is implemented (Bahr, 2008) as 
well as by the presence of national-level  ‘supportive  Institutions’   in  terms  of  
inflation controls, trust, openness and the lack of corrupt practices (Ederveen, 
De Groot and Nahuis, 2006), the degree of openness of the economies 
(Ederveen,   Gorter   Mooij   and   Nahuis,   2002)   and   national   “institutional  
quality”   in   terms   of   the   rule   of   law,   corruption,   bureaucracy,   expropriation  
risk  and  governments’  treatment  of  contracts  (De  Freitas, Pereira and Torres, 
2003).  
 
With respect to the role played by regional structural characteristics for the 
impact of the EU Regional Policy, one of the discriminants is the geographical 
position of the beneficiary regions with respect to either the geographical 
‘core’   of   the   European   Union   or   a   country’s   decision-making centres 
(Soukiazis and Antunes, 2006).  
 
Another discriminating factor refers to the initial conditions of the regions 
considered.   The   Regional   Policy’s   effect   is   positive   with   regard   to less 
The EU Cohesion policy in context 
5   
developed   European   regions   (‘Objective   1’   regions   and   cohesion-country 
regions). This has also been confirmed in terms of GDP per capita level, GDP 
growth, employment (Bouayad-agha, Turpin and Védrine, 2010; Esposti and 
Bussoletti, 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 2008; Ramajo, Màrquez, Hewings and 
Salinas, 2008) and cumulative job creation (Martin and Tyler, 2006). The same 
results were found by analyses that pooled the regions of all the 27 European 
countries together (Eggert et al., 2008). Furthermore, country-level effects are 
also relevant. Once regions are clustered by country, the positive impact on 
convergence is not confirmed for Germany, Greece or Spain (Esposti and 
Bussoletti,   2008).      The   policy’s   impact   is   stronger   in   European   areas   with  
stronger absorptive capacity and weaker in the most disadvantaged areas 
(Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2003).  Finally, innovative 
capacity and Social Filters (broader regional socio-economic environment) are 
discriminants for European Territorial Infrastructural Policies (TEN-T) 
financed   by   the   EU   Regional   Policy   funds.   In   their   absence,   the   policy’s  
impact is non-significant or even negative (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2012). There is also consensus on the idea that the effect of total expenditure is 
not positive in absolute terms but individual areas of policy intervention may 
produce heterogeneous effects (Dall'erba, Guillain and Le Gallo, 2007). Only 
‘education  and  human  capital’   investments  have  actually  sustained  medium  
term growth. Instead, support   for   ‘agriculture   and   rural   promotion’,  
‘infrastructure’  and  ‘business’  was  less  effective  (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 
2004).   
 
The analysis of the existing literature shows that among the factors 
conditioning the impacts of the EU regional policy very limited attention has 
been paid so far to the role played by other EU policies that co-exist and 
interact with the EU regional policy on the ground. From a conceptual 
standpoint this may hide relevant processes in the understanding of regional 
Riccardo Crescenzi and Mara Giua 
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growth dynamics and policies (Duhr et al., 2010; OECD, 2009). From a 
methodological point of view, overlooking (some of) the elements that 
influence the relationship between the EU Regional Policy and regional 
economic performance, entails omitted variable and reverse causality biases 
(Mohl and Hagen, 2010) in part possibly explaining the conflicting 
conclusions reached by existing studies1. 
 
During their respective developments, regional policy and the CAP have 
influenced one another. Together they represent roughly 80% of the total 
2014-20  EU  budget  (EU  Commission,  2013).  For  a  long  time,  the  CAP’s  market  
measures were at the core of EU policies. Instead, regional policy and rural 
development policies were underfunded and marginally developed 
(Crescenzi, de Filippis and Pierangeli, 2014; Saraceno, 2002). With the Reform 
of the Structural Funds (1989) and Agenda 2000, the CAP and the EU regional 
Policy became closely interdependent. In the 2000-2006 policy programming 
period, regional and rural development policies were part of the same joint 
programmatic framework and their different measures were implemented by 
the same Institutions (Mairate, 2006; Manzella et al., 2009). In the 2007-2013 
EU budget period they were again separated from one another in term of 
programming and managing authorities. However, both EU institutions and 
researchers continue to stress their common contribution towards cohesion 
(Barca, 2009). 
 
Given   their   ‘spatially   targeted’  nature,   the  strongest   relation   is   that  between  
regional and rural development policies.  However, it is increasingly 
recognized  that  the  CAP’s  market  measures  have  also  spatial  implications.  In  
line  with  the  sector  aim  of  agriculture  support,  CAP  resources  are  ‘captured’                                                          1 Mohl and Hagen (2010) reviewed at least 15 other quantitative studies, which with similar approaches to those discussed above reached altogether conflicting conclusions on the impact of cohesion policies. 
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by dynamic, higher specialized and productive agriculture (Duhr et al., 2010). 
This feature of First Pillar CAP has a potentially perverse impact in terms of 
‘distributive  equity’  by  favouring  the  polarization  of  agricultural  income  and  
preventing less developed areas from benefiting from its support (ESPON, 
2004).  
 
In the absence of proper coordination the literature has highlighted the risk of 
a counter-treatment effect on overall economic growth whereby one policy 
area may counterbalance the pro-cohesion effects of the other (Barca, 2009; 
European Commission, 2010; Duhr et al., 2010). Sectoral policies such as the 
CAP are designed to sustain a strategic sector rather than to promote cohesion 
and the former objective could have a completely countervailing effect on the 
second (Bivand e Brundstad, 2003; Bureau and Mahè, 2008).  
 
 This potential mismatch between sectoral and territorial objectives applies 
more to first-pillar CAP incentives than to rural development policies, which, 
on the contrary, can minimize the critical effects of CAP market measures 
(Shucksmith et al., 2005).  In addition other research suggests that the CAP 
does not counteract the impact of the EU Regional Policy (Esposti, 2007) and 
once regional characteristics are appropriately controlled for, its contribution 
to cohesion is even greater   than   ‘Objective   1’   funds   (Montresor,   Pecci   and  
Pontarollo, 2011).   
 
Overall this potentially very critical effect is still unclear as attempts to 
evaluate it in the literature are few and far between. Regional and agricultural 
economists very rarely work together in this direction and sometimes this 
lack of cooperation is exacerbated by the difficulty of integrating different 
data sources as also by the sharp division in responsibilities between different 
administrations at the EU, National and Regional levels (Kilkenny, 2010). 
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3. Model of empirical analysis  
 
In line with the existing literature on the analysis of regional growth 
dynamics we specify a standard regional growth model (Cappelen et al. 2003; 
Camagni and Capello, 2010 & 2013; Capello and Lenzi, 2013; Crescenzi and 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2011 and 2012; Paci and Marrocu, 2013; Petrakos et al. 2005a 
and  b,  2011)  augmented  by  a      ‘EU  policy  matrix’      that   includes  expenditure  
under   the   EU   Regional   Policy,   Rural   Development   and   CAP;   a   ‘territorial  
conditioning   factors   matrix’   that   includes   proxies   for   regional   structural  
conditions  that  influence  policy  outcomes;     and  a  ‘Policy   interactions  matrix’  
that includes the interaction terms between the different policies and between 
the policies and regional contextual conditions.  
 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
∆Y୧୲ିଵ,୲ = β଴  Y୧଴ + βଵ  X1୧୲ିଵ + βଶ  X2୧୲ିଵ + βଷ  X3୧୲ିଵ + βସ  WX୧୲ିଵ + βହ  C୧୲ିଵ + ε୧୲          (1) 
 
Where: 
ΔY  is  the  regional  GDP  average  growth  rate  over  the  period  from  t-1 to t; 
Y is the natural logarithm of the level of regional GDP per capita at the 
beginning of each period; 
X1  is  the  ‘EU  policy  matrix’; 
X2  is  the  ‘Territorial  conditioning  factors  matrix’; 
X3  is  the  ‘Policy  interactions  matrix’; 
WX is the spatially-lagged variables matrix; 
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C is a matrix of standard control variables; 
ɛ is idiosyncratic error 
and where i represents the unit of analysis and t the policy programming 
period (1994-1999; 2000-2006; 2007-2013/09). 
 
In greater detail, the variables included in the model are as follows: 
 
Regional GDP Growth rate per capita  
The growth rate of regional GDP is the dependent variable and is used as a 
proxy for regional economic performance. It is computed as the logarithmic 
ratio between average GDP per capita for the first three years of the period t 
and the correspondent value for the period t-1. As is customary in growth 
analyses, GDP growth rate is hence computed over multiannual periods 
rather than on a yearly basis in order to minimize the influence of external 
macro trends and shocks (the robustness checks confirm that results are 
robust to different methodological choices in this regard). 
 
 ‘EU  Policy matrix’  
The role of EU policies in regional growth dynamics is captured by examining 
the corresponding expenditure in each region for the entire EU budget 
programming periods 1994-99; 2000-06 and 2007-13 for Regional Policy, Rural 
Development  Policy   (‘spatially   targeted’  policies)   and  CAP   (‘spatially  blind’  
policy with territorial implications).  
‘Territorial  conditioning  factors  matrix’  
This matrix aims to include the key territorial features that shape policy 
success and failure under the strong constraint of data availability for all EU 
Riccardo Crescenzi and Mara Giua 
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regions. It includes structural socio-economic conditions in terms of 
demographics, productive structure and the labour market as well as regional 
innovative capacity and infrastructural endowment.  
 
In particular, socio-economic conditions are captured by a Social Filter Index - 
a composite index extensively used in existing studies on innovation and 
regional growth  (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose 2009 and 2011) combining a 
set of proxies for territorial structural preconditions conducive to favourable 
environments for the genesis of innovation and its translation into economic 
growth. The Social Filter Index covers to two main domains: educational 
achievement (Crescenzi, 2005; Iammarino, 2005; Lucas, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; 
Malecki, 1997; Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008) and the productive 
employment of human resources (Fagerberg et al., 1997; Rodríguez-Pose, 
1999).  
 
With reference to the first domain, the index accounts for human capital 
accumulation (share of tertiary educated population in relation to the 
population aged 15+) and the skilled labour force (share of tertiary educated 
employees in relation to total employees). For the second domain, 
employment in agriculture is included in order to account for the composition 
of the local productive structure. The long-term component of regional 
unemployment (long-term unemployment percentage) is included in the 
index in order to account for such local labour market conditions as the 
rigidity of local labour markets and the stratification of inadequate skills 
(Gordon, 2001) that hamper innovation and economic growth2.                                                          2 The index is calculated by using Principal Component Analysis (PCA)  and accounts (considering only its first component) for around 50% of the total variance in the single variables that it synthetizes (Tables B.1 and B.2, Appendix B). It prevents collinearity problems potentially generated by the simultaneous inclusion of all the variables in the model (Duntenam, 1989; Esposti et al., 2013). The four variables considered enter the composite index with the expected sign: human capital and skilled labour force – which also displays the greatest relative weighting 
The EU Cohesion policy in context 
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Other two important features influencing policy impacts are: a) the level of 
R&D  activities  (R&D’s  share  of  GDP  at  the  territorial  unit  level,  Eurostat)  that  
“captures the existence of a system of incentives (in the public and the private 
sector)   for   intentional   innovative   activities”   (Crescenzi   and  Rodríguez-Pose, 
2011, p. 14); b) the level of regional infrastructural endowment (regional 
kilometers of motorways standardized  by  ‘total  regional  surface’3)  as a proxy 
for  a  region’s  existing  physical  capital  endowment.     
 
Interactions matrix 
This matrix includes two key types of interactions: interactions between the 
individual   components   of   the   ‘EU   policy   matrix’   – in order to capture 
synergies or trade-offs between different EU policies – and interactions 
between   the   ‘policies’   and   the   ‘conditioning   factors’   matrices   in   order   to  
identify   factors   conditioning   the   policies’   impacts.   The   elements   of   this  
‘interactions   matrix’   can   capture   the   existence   of   synergetic/countervailing  
forces  able  to  influence  the  policy’s  impact  by  augmenting  or  diminishing  its  
magnitude. In particular, in line with the conditioned impact literature 
(Ederveen, Gorter Mooij and Nahuis, 2002; Ederveen, De Groot and Nahuis, 
2006), the overall impact of the policy is evaluated by assessing the sign and 
joint significance of the coefficient of the policy itself (i.e. the coefficient of the 
variable  of  interest  indicated  in  the  ‘policy  matrix’)  and  the coefficient of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
– have a positive sign, while long-term unemployment and the agricultural share of employment, by contrast, figure in the social filter index with a negative sign. The Index is computed for each year (time variant indicator) holding constant the PCA coefficients (computed on the longitudinal dataset).  The stationarity of the variables was preliminarily tested: The tests confirmed the stationarity of the series, allowing us to implement the PCA analysis on the panel dataset and assure the comparability of the index across programming periods. 3 The standardisation proposed is used in order to purge potential biases linked to the different geographical sizes of the EU regions. Even if it is customary to use this proxy in the literature, it should be stressed that it says nothing about the quality and condition of the infrastructures themselves and nor does it reflect differences in construction and maintenance costs. 
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term  of  interaction  with  the  identified  conditioning  factors  (i.e.  the  ‘interaction  
matrix’)4.  
 
Spatially lagged variables 
In order to account for interactions between neighbouring regions, this 
additional matrix introduces the spatially   lagged   values   of   ‘conditioning  
factors’.  These  values  enable  us   to  explicitly  model  spatially-mediated inter-
regional spillovers while, at the same time, minimising the spatial 
autocorrelation of the residuals. In particular, the spatially lagged variables 
included in the model are calculated by multiplying each territorial variable 
by a spatial matrix computed with the k-nearest neighbours (with k=4) 
criterion,  which  can  minimize  not  only  ‘endogeneity’   induced  by  travel-time 
distance weighting but also potential bias due to differences in the number of 
neighbours as between central and peripheral European regions. In particular, 
the   ‘spatially   lagged  matrix’   includes   the  spatially   lagged  value  of  the  social  
filter index, spatially lagged R&D activities and the spatially lagged 
infrastructural endowment.   
 
These spatially lagged indicators place each region in the broader European 
space, thus making it possible to assess their interactions with neighbouring 
regions. They can capture spillovers of various kinds influenced by 
geographical accessibility or peripherality. Favourable socio-economic 
conditions in neighbouring regions (spatially lagged social filter index) 
influence indigenous economic performance thought imitative effects and the 
mobility/movement of human capital/skills facilitated by geographical                                                         4 In the paper, in line with the existing literature on conditioned impact, we focus on the sign and significance of coefficients, rather than on the size of specific point estimates. In general, following Wooldridge (2003), the magnitude of the overall effect can be computed by plugging in interesting values of the interacted variable (e.g. the mean or the lower and upper quartiles in the sample) to obtain the partial effect. 
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proximity. Accessibility to extra-regional innovative activities (spatially 
lagged R&D variable) can also influence internal economic performance 
through localised knowledge spillovers while the infrastructural endowment 
of neighbouring regions insures adequate accessibility to the region and the 
lack of transport bottlenecks. 
 
Control matrix 
This matrix is included in each specification of the model as it contains a set of 
standard controls. Controls for   the   “initial   conditions”   of   the   regions   are  
obtained by including the log-level of GDP per capita (Eurostat) at the 
beginning of each period (OECD, 2009). In addition, the national annual 
growth rate accounts for the link between the national economic context and 
regional economic performance (Monastiriotis, 2014) while minimizing the 
effect of spatial autocorrelation by accounting for some of the common trends 
that characterize groups of territorial units; the Krugman index of 
specialization controls for the specialisation in local employment (Midelfart-
Knarvik and Overman, 2002) by giving territorial unit i a zero rating if it has 
an industrial structure identical to other units, and by attributing a maximum 
value of 2 if it has no industries in common with other territorial units, and 
finally   the   population   density   controls   for   the   local   economy’s   degree   of  
agglomeration. 
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3.1 Units of analysis and data sources 
 
In terms of geographical units the analysis is based on a combination of 
NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 regions in order to maximise the homogeneity of the 
territorial units in terms of the degree of autonomy and administrative roles 
as also to capture the relevant target area in which the policies under analysis 
are being implemented.  
 
Consequently, the sample contains NUTS-1 regions for Belgium, Germany 
and the United Kingdom and NUTS-2 for the other European countries 
(Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden). Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg are excluded from the analysis 
because they have no equivalent sub-national regions for the whole period of 
the analysis. In addition, lack of data prevents the French Départments 
d’Outre-Mer (FR9) and of Trentino-Alto Adige from being introduced, while, 
given the introduction of spatially-lagged variables, remote islands or 
enclaves could not be included. The analysis is necessarily limited to the EU-
15 countries that have been recipients of EU Regional Policy, Rural 
Development and CAP funding for a sufficiently long time span.  
 
Therefore, the final database comprises 139 territorial units (European NUTS-
1 and NUTS-2) belonging to 12 European EU-15 countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom)5. The analysis has been performed over 3 
EU-Budget programming periods (1994-1999; 2000-2006; 2007-2013).  
 
                                                        5 Due to lack of data on R&D Activities and on the variables composing the Social Filter Index finally, the effective number of observations in the analysis turned out to be 121. 
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Structural   Fund   (ERDF   and   ESF)   data   (per   capita   ‘commitments’   for   each  
policy programming period) have been provided for by the Directorate 
General for Regional Policy of the European Commission (DG REGIO) in May 
2009.  Data referring on Rural Development Policy are based on per capita 
‘commitments’   for   each policy programming period.  The first-pillar CAP 
data are instead, based on actual expenditure based on CAP total subsidies on 
crops and on livestock and CAP decoupled payments included in the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN). The details of the computation of the 
regionalised expenditure data for Rural Development and CAP are discussed 
in Crescenzi et al. 2014.  
 
The data for all territorial variables (dependent and independent) come from 
Eurostat6. The values assigned to each of the three periods are computed as 
the average of their annual values over the policy programming period itself. 
With respect to the latest programming periods (2007-2013) all the territorial 
data are computed as an average of their annual values from 2007 to 2009, as 
2009 is the last year for which data are available.  
 
The choice of aggregating all expenditure/commitment data by programming 
period is customary in the literature due to the lack of reliability of annual 
expenditure data, in its turn a consequence of the complexity of EU budgetary 
and reporting rules: i.e. expenditure reported in a specific year might not 
necessarily be spent in that year. In addition, this choice allows us to 
minimize reverse causality (Mohl and Hagen, 2010) much more effectively 
than with annual data. Whole-period commitments are in fact assigned at the 
beginning of a multiannual period and, consequently, they do not depend on 
any subsequent shock (e.g., economic macro trend) that could occur over the                                                         6 Data on GDP Growth Rate for the Austrian and the Italian regions and data on Population density for the Spanish regions come from national sources because they are not available on the Eurostat System.  
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period under analysis, thus leading to adjustments to annual expenditure. 
The same multiannual specification is also generally preferred for the 
“regional  growth  rate”,  which  instead  of  being  computed  as  the  ratio  between  
the level of GDP per capita in two consecutive years, is usually considered as 
the ratio between average GDP per capita levels over a period of at least 5-
years (OECD, 2009). The analysis conforms strictly to the literature and in this 
sense adopts the most common specification for the model: regional growth 
rate between time t and time t-1 is regressed on the policy at time t-1, where t 
stands for the policy programming periods. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results and Robustness Checks 
 
The model specified in Equation 1 is estimated by means of Fixed Effect panel 
data (FE). In estimating the model, Fixed Effect-FE were found to be 
preferable to both Random Effect-RE and Correlated Random Effect-CRE 
specifications7 (Wooldridge, 2002). Classical tests (such as Wald, R-squared 
and F-test) were carried out on the estimated FE model. Moreover, the model 
controls for heteroschedasticity and the spatial autocorrelation of the 
residuals. Finally, the time Fixed Effects have been captured by including 
time dummy variables in the analysis after obtaining evidence on their joint 
significance. 
 
                                                         7 FE	  results	  were	  compared	  to	  RE’s	  by	  applying	  the	  Hausman	  Tests	  (Hausman	  and	  Tylor,	  1981).	  
In	   addition,	   when	   comparing	   FE	   estimations	   to	   the	   “Modified	   Random	   Effect”	   estimator	  (Hajivassiliou, 2011) for CRE it was concluded that the FE estimator captures all exogenous variability available in the model and that FE was not only a consistent but also an efficient estimator for the regression coefficients (Hajivassiliou, 2011). These additional results are available upon request. 
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4.1 Empirical results 
 
The presentation of the results is organised as follows. Table 1 presents some 
key descriptive statistics. Table 2 looks at total commitments/expenditure for 
all EU policies (regional, rural development and CAP together) while table 3 
looks at each policy separately and at their interactions. The test statistics 
carried out for all versions of the model (reported at the bottom of the tables) 
confirm the significance of the regressions (F-test) and their predictive 
capacity (R Squared). Furthermore, the Wald test confirms not only the 
significance of the single coefficients but also the joint significance of the 
coefficients of the variable  of   interest   (policy)  and  the  “terms  of   interaction”  
coefficients (Ederveen, De Groot and Nahuis, 2006).  The inclusion of the 
spatially lagged variables allows us to remove spatial autocorrelation with no 
impact on the significance of the key variables  of   interests.  Moran’s   Indexes  
are computed for residuals of all specifications, rejecting the presence of 
Spatial Autocorrelation after the inclusion of the spatially lagged explanatory 
variables. In the robustness checks section the key specification of the model 
is re-estimated by means of spatial panel data models, confirming the results 
reported in the main tables and allowing us to exclude any bias due to spatial 
autocorrelation8. 
 
This is an exploratory analysis aimed at uncovering territorial dynamics 
linked with the EU Policies rather than identifying causal relationships – 
consequently, in what follows, we focus mainly on the sign and significance 
of coefficients, rather than the size of specific point estimates. 
 
                                                        8 In the main tables we prefer to report the standard panel data models in order to maximise comparability with other existing research and facilitate interpretation of the key coefficients. 
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Table 1 shows the magnitude and distribution  of   the  policies’   commitments  
over time: the most significant part of the total EU funding is represented by 
the  CAP  and  Regional  Policy.  Rural  Development  Policy’s  role  in  terms  of  the  
amount of resources is still relatively small (Table 1).   
Table 1 - Policy Commitments (in Euro values, per capita) and Regional Growth 
(average rate). Financial Periods 1994-1999; 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.    Mean Std. dev CAP 1994-99 813.47 631.47  2000-06 1118.44 847.91  2007-13 1042.24 834.57 Regional Policy 1994-99 413.61 481.23  2000-06 652.84 707.95  2007-13 531.17 540.32 Rural Development Policy 1994-99 78.82 95.52  2000-06 202.25 213.91  2007-13 206.26 181.36 Regional GDP per capita average growth rate 1994-99 0.0198 0.0017  2000-06 0.0255 0.0010  2007-13 -0.0124 0.0026 
Source:	  authors’	  elaboration	  using	  European	  Commission	  Data  
Moreover, both the CAP and the EU Regional Policy increased their resources 
from the first to the second programming period but underwent a reduction 
in the latest period (2007-2013) as a consequence of the extension of the 
policies to the New Member States of the EU. Funds for Rural Development 
Policy increased over the whole period studied (1994-1999; 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013).  
 
In contrast to the positive trend registered across the first two policy 
programming periods, the growth rate during the period 2007-2013 
diminished, and actually turned negative. As expected, the correlation 
between the policy commitments (considered as a whole) and GDP growth 
rate was also positive (0.6) and significant. In considering the negative sign 
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for GDP growth rate over the period 2007-2013, account must, of course, be 
taken of the major economic crisis that has befallen the European and the 
world economy since 2008, which most likely driving the general economic 
growth downward. 
 
Table 2 offers the key initial diagnostics for regional growth dynamics and EU 
expenditure. Total EU funding is positively and significantly correlated with 
regional economic growth. There is no evidence of a composition effect 
neutralising the overall impact of total EU funding: when considering total 
committed expenditure for EU Regional Policy (ERFD and ESF), the Rural 
Development Policy and the CAP together, the link with regional economic 
growth is positive and significant.  
 
When looking at the role of other key drivers of regional economic 
performance, table 2 shows that the coefficient of initial conditions (level of 
GDP at the beginning of the period) is negative and highly significant, 
detecting a process of conditional regional convergence. The social filter – the 
broader set of socio-economic conditions – has also a positive but only 
marginally significant correlation with economic growth. The key controls 
behave as expected. The national growth exerts a positive and significant 
influence on regional growth, confirming the importance of national 
framework conditions for regional performance (Monastiriotis, 2014).  The 
Krugman Index – negative and highly significant - confirms that 
diversification is a key strength for EU regions. When spatially lagged 
variables are introduced into the regression (column 2) the high significance 
of Total EU funding is confirmed and inter-regional knowledge spillovers 
emerge as a key driver for regional growth in line with previous literature 
(Moreno et al. 2005a and b; Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi 2008). 
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Table 2 - EU Regional Growth and overall EU Spending (All Policies). Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate   1 2 Total EU Funding 0.0570*** (0.0122) 0.0520*** (0.0125) Ln of initial GDP p.c. -0.8016*** (0.0676) -0.7570*** (0.0670) Social Filter Index  0.0190*  (0.0102) -0.0002  (0.0176) R&D Activities 0.0055  (0.0208) 0.0070  (0.0195) Infrastructural endowment 1.5220  (1.1194) 0.8422 (0.9630) Spatially Lagged Social Filter   0.0249 (0.0168) Spatially lagged R&D Activities  0.0330** (0.0167) Spatially lagged Infrastructure  2.1387 (1.4234) National Growth Rate 0.1270*** (0.0141) 0.1352*** (0.0147) Krugman Index -0.0670** (0.0286) -0.0771** (0.0304) Population Density 0.0001  (0.0000) 0.0001*  (0.0000) Constant 7.7730***  (0.6841) 7.2372*** (0.6717) Obs R squared  Prob>F 
242 0.902 0.000  
242 0.908 0.000  Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table   3   opens   the   ‘black   box’   of   total   EU   funding.   The   first   specification  
(column 1) relates the dependent variable to the policy variables, the 
territorial conditioning factors (social filter index, R&D activities and 
infrastructural endowment), the spatially lagged terms and the control 
variables (coefficients not reported in the table as in line with table 2). 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 show the results obtained by considering the interactions 
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between the various EU Policies and the territorial conditioning factors: 
column 2 shows the interaction between each EU policy and the social filter 
index;  column  3  shows  the  policy’s  interaction  with  R&D  Activities;  column  4  
shows   the   policy’s   interaction   with   the   infrastructural   endowment.   Finally,  
column 5 shows the results obtained by considering the interactions within 
the   ‘EU   policy  matrix’   referring  with   interactions   between   the   regional,   the  
rural development and the common agricultural policies. 
 
Column 1 shows that the positive influence of total European funding should 
be attributed to the positive and significant role played by the EU Regional 
Policy while the coefficients of both Rural Development Policy and CAP are 
not significant. The EU Regional Policy is the only EU budget heading 
delivering a positive influence   on   regional   growth.   The   ‘spatially   targeted’  
approach of the EU Regional Policy  has been successful in supporting 
regional growth. Conversely, the CAP – notwithstanding the relevance of the 
financial resources distributed in each region – has not produced any relevant 
influence on average regional growth. Furthermore, the results for rural 
development are not more encouraging: even if rural development policies 
should, in principle, combine an emphasis on rural areas with a bottom-up 
approach, they seem  unable  to  do  better  than  ‘traditional’  CAP  interventions  
in terms of territorial cohesion.   
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Table 3 – Regional Growth and the EU Regional Policy, Rural Development Policy and 
CAP. 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  - The log of initial 
GDP,	   ‘territorial	  conditioning	   factors’	   (Social	  Filter	   Index,	  R&D	  Activities,	   Infrastructural	  endowment	  Spatially Lagged Social Filter, Spatially lagged R&D Activities, Spatially lagged infrastructure) and the same control variables (Constant; National Growth Rate; Krugman Index and Population Density) reported in Table 1 are included in all regressions but not reported in the table.   
Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  1 2 3 4 5 Regional Policy 0.1028*** (0.0301) 0.1365*** (0.0359) 0.1095*** (0.0354) 0.1184*** (0.0354) -0.0569 (0.0551) Rural Development Policy 0.0026  (0.0236) 0.0172  (0.0273) -0.0649 (0.0358) -0.0400  (0.0282) 0.1116 (0.0734) CAP 0.0308  (0.0235) 0.0245  (0.0305) 0.0804 (0.0348) 0.0458* (0.0254) -0.0060 (0.0385) Social Filter Index*Regional Policy  0.0414** (0.0205)    Social Filter Index*Rural Development Policy  0.0067 (0.0397)    Social Filter Index*CAP  -0.0129  (0.0120)    R&D Activities*Regional Policy   -0.0014 (0.0353)   R&D Activities*Rural Development Policy   0.0264*** (0.0001)   R&D Activities*CAP   -0.0410** (0.0178)   Infrastructure*Regional Policy    -2.0114 (1.5513)  Infrastructure*Rural Development Policy    3.8648** (1.4986)  Infrastructure*CAP    -2.8016** (1.1935)  Regional Policy* Rural Development Policy     0.1452** (0.0638) Regional Policy*CAP     0.0422** (0.0185) Rural Development Policy*CAP     -0.1056*** (0.0376) 
Log	  of	  Initial	  GDP,	  ‘Territorial	  Conditioning Factors’,	  	  
‘Spatially	  Lagged	  terms’	  ,	  Controls and constant X X X X X Period Dummies X X X X X Obs  R squared  Prob>F 
242 0.913 0.000 
242 0.921 0.000 
242 0.916 0.000 
242 0.917 0.000 
242 0.922 0.000 
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The analysis of the interaction terms makes it possible: i) to explore how the 
role of regional policy depends on the whole structure of the EU policies and 
of the territorial conditioning factors; ii) to capture potential synergies or 
conflicts between Regional and other EU policies of different nature and iii) to 
understand how these interactions can change depending on the territorial 
context. 
 
The links between expenditure for the various policies and socio-economic 
contextual conditions are depicted by the interaction terms between the 
individual EU policy variables and the social filter index. The corresponding 
results are reported in column 2. Socio-economic conditions turn out to be a 
positive conditioning factor for regional policy impacts. The relationship 
between Regional Policy funding  and  regional growth is stronger for areas 
with more favourable socio-economic conditions: both the coefficients of the 
EU  Regional  Policy  and  that  for  the  term  of  interaction  ‘regional  policy*social  
filter   index’   are   positive   and   significant.   Thus,   regional   policy   generally  
supports growth but with stronger benefits for areas with favourable socio-
economic conditions. It also emerges that the impact of Rural Development 
Policies and CAP is totally independent of socio-economic contextual 
conditions: their impact is not significant generally and nor is it conditioned 
by the socio-economic conditions of the regions.  
 
The interactions between EU policies and regional R&D activities and 
infrastructural endowment are presented in columns 3 and 4 respectively. The 
coefficients of the corresponding interaction terms (and the joint significance 
of the direct and interacted coefficients) suggest that both R&D activities and 
infrastructure matter when Rural Development and CAP funds are 
considered. In particular, Rural Development funds might influence economic 
growth when targeted at regions with a comparatively stronger innovative 
Riccardo Crescenzi and Mara Giua 
   24 
and infrastructural environment (i.e. the most dynamic rural areas in Europe). 
Conversely, CAP funds – with their spatially blind approach, uninfluenced by 
the a priori quality of the region in the allocation of the funds – work better in 
the most disadvantaged areas, characterised by limited infrastructural and 
innovation endowment. This section of the analysis, therefore, confirms that 
‘spatially  blind’  policies  do  have spatial implications. Given that CAP funding 
is   not   influenced   by   the   capabilities   of   the   different   regions   to   ‘bargain’   for  
resources - these are allocated in a top-down fashion by means of subsidies 
largely  linked  to  ‘historical’  production  data9 – they are able to exert a positive 
influence on economic growth in most of the structurally disadvantaged 
regions. In addition CAP and Rural Development policy, even if funded by 
the same financial source, seem work in opposite directions when interacting 
with contextual conditions at the local level. In this sense, Rural Development 
policy   behaves   in   a  manner  more   in   line  with   ‘spatially   targeted’   approach  
(Regional Policy).  
 
The results in column 5 of Table 3 provide new evidence on the links within 
the   ‘EU   policy   matrix’:   the   model   specification   now   includes   the   terms   of  
interaction between Regional Policy and the other EU policies. The EU 
Regional   Policy’s   role   is   positively   conditioned   by   synergies   with   all   other  
policies: all interaction terms are positive and capture the marginal benefit 
from the policies on cohesion determined by such synergies. Instead, the 
interaction   between   the   two   ‘agricultural’   policies   (CAP   and   Rural  
Development policy) shows a negative sign. When both CAP and Rural 
Development funds are targeted at regions that also benefit from more 
generous EU Regional Policy resources, the positive influence on regional                                                         9 The progressive de-coupling of support from production introduced since 2003 by the so called Fischler Reform and the further move of the CAP 2014-2020 towards a first pillar with a fully decoupled support progressively based on a flat rate per hectare reinforces the top-down nature of this policy. 
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growth is - ceteris paribus – maximised. But the same is not true for the 
interaction between Rural Development and CAP: when both   ‘agricultural’  
policies channel a high level of funding to the same region they tend to 
generate sectoral distortions detrimental to long-term economic growth. 
Consequently, it seems to be that synergistic use of different sources of 
funding and tools of a diversified nature can boost economic growth,  while 
‘specialisation’   in   one   single   policy   area   is   likely   to   generate   decreasing  
returns and reinforce inconsistencies. 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
 
The robustness of the results is tested in a number of ways and the 
corresponding additional tables are included in Appendix A available on line. 
 
Measurement error and endogeneity bias 
In order to test for measurement error problems the analysis was reproduced 
with the use of an alternative measure for the key independent variable of 
interest. The policy variable adopted in the main analysis (whole period 
Commitments) is replaced by annual payments.  Whole-period Commitments 
are considered in the literature more reliable policy indicators than annual 
Payments (OECD, 2009; Mohl and Hagen, 2010).  Whole-period averages are 
more accurate than annual data given that annual payments largely reflect 
reporting and accounting rules rather than actual expenditure patterns. In 
addition, whole-period commitments are more exogenous with respect to 
external shocks that can simultaneously influence both economic growth and 
expenditure. An example of this problem is the well-documented increase in 
Structural Funds actual expenditure in response to the Crisis started in 2008 
(European Parliament, 2014).   
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The key regressions have been replicated with a specification, sample and 
time period that enable us to make comparisons as between the results of the 
estimation of equation 1 obtained by using Commitments (as in previous 
tables) and actual payments. Further details on these additional estimations 
are reported in Appendix A. The additional regressions confirm that the 
impact of the impact of the EU Regional Policy on regional economic growth 
is positive and significant when commitments from this alternative database 
as well as when payments are used as an alternative policy measure, 
provided that their endogeneity is appropriately accounted for in an IV 
framework. 
 
In order to address any potential endogeneity issues, and identify the 
parameter of interest more accurately, we explicitly allow actual payments to 
be an endogenous variable and use commitments (decided a priori and well 
before actual economic growth is observable) as the corresponding 
instrument in an Instrumental Variable analysis. The choice of the instrument 
is confirmed by the first stage regression, and justified by the fact that 
Commitments, strongly correlated with Payments, only influence the 
economic performance of regions when transformed into expenditure 
(through the payments channel). Consequently, they represent an exogenous 
and relevant instrument to permit the model to correct the endogeneity bias 
likely to affect Payments. 
 
The Hausman test confirms our   intuition   as   concerns   the   ‘endogeneity’   of  
Payments. The IV regression that instruments Payments with the 
Commitments is preferred to OLS, as the latter considers Payments 
exogenous. The results of the IV regression are set out in Table A.1 column 3.  
 
The EU Cohesion policy in context 
27   
Overall these tests confirm the choice of our key policy variable. 
Commitments are not only capable of acting as a proxy for the policy by 
delivering the same results that would have been produced by considering 
the effective expenditure, but also that the Payments by themselves are 
unlikely to account for policy in a coherent manner insofar as identified as 
endogenous by the Hausman test10 for endogeneity. 
 
As  in  other   transition  countries   in  SEE   in   the   first  wave  of   the  EU’s  Eastern  
enlargement, Slovenia adopted a gradualist approach to privatisation. Even at 
the point of accession to the EU in 2004, the main state owned banks had not 
been privatised. In fact, privatisation in Slovenia resulted perversely in 
greater state control, since most firms allegedly privatised were bought out by 
state funds and by state-sponsored privatisation investment funds (Pahor et 
al., 2004). In the run-up to EU accession, the Slovenian policy changed to a 
greater emphasis on horizontal industrial policies and the removal of 
subsidies  and   state   aids   for   industry   in  keeping  with   the  EU  acquis   (Šuštar,  
2004).  On  the  eve  of  accession,  the  EU’s  Comprehensive  Monitoring  Report  on  
Slovenia recommended the termination of the Slovenian Development 
Corporation, the body that owned state companies, as its main 
recommendation on the Chapter on Industrial Policy (EC, 2003).  
 
Misspecification of the dependent variable 
The specification of the model is in line with the standard panel data 
literature on regional economic growth and regional policy analysis (OECD, 
2009; Mohl and Hagen, 2010). In order to control for the robustness of the 
results with respect to the specification of the outcome variable, the model is 
re-estimated with an alternative version of the GDP growth rate.  In                                                         10 The p value of the test is equal to 0.0041. 
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particular, the main regression is re-estimated with a GDP growth rate 
computed as the natural logarithmic of average annual GDP growth rate over 
the first three years of each programming period t. This outcome variable is 
regressed onto the dependent variables taken at the time t-1 so that the GDP 
growth rate can be computed with respect to an initial period that is 
successive to the period to which the policy is related rather than coinciding 
with it. This eliminates any time overlap between the dependent and 
explanatory variable and reduce any simultaneity bias likely to affect the 
model: in this case, the idiosyncratic shocks occurred during the policy 
multiannual programming period (t-1) do not enter in the computation of the 
GDP growth rate determined within the following policy multiannual 
programming period (t). These robustness tests confirm the results of the 
main analysis (Tables A.2.a and A.2.b. in Appendix A):  even when the 
outcome variable is changed, the role of EU Regional Policy as well as that of 
overall European support remains positive and significant. 
 
Misspecification of the model and linearity: Quantile Regression analysis 
This additional robustness check makes use of Quantile Regression (QR) 
methods   in   order   to   ascertain   if   the   policy’s   influence   on   regional   growth  
changes with the distribution of regional growth. QR makes it possible to 
measure the effect of covariates not only at the centre of the distribution, but 
also in the upper and lower tails (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Chernozhukov 
and Hansen, 2004) and it is employed to determine to what extent the impact 
of the policy (X) depends on  regional features in terms of economic growth 
(Y). This additional analysis captures if and to what extent areas with 
different   regional   growth   rate   levels   (three   distribution’s   quantiles   0.10,   0.5  
and 0.75) benefit from the EU Regional Policy.  QR estimates are not 
presented as our key results given that the current state-of-the-art in the 
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literature in the field does not allow to apply QR in a Fixed Effect panel data 
framework (Kato, Galvao and Monte Rojas, 2012; Ponomareva, 2011). Given 
the importance of omitted variable bias in this context we prefer to keep FE 
estimates as our main results and use QR as a robustness check.  The details 
for this additional analysis are reported in Appendix A together with the key 
results.  The results are reported in Table A.3 in Appendix A. The coefficients 
of the key variables support the results of the main analysis. They also 
confirm that the link between EU Regional Policy spending and Economic 
Growth is stronger in relatively richer and faster-growing areas. This finding 
suggests  that  although  the  policy’s  role  is  generally  positive,  it  is  not  working 
completely in line with its main aim, namely to remedy the gaps between the 
disadvantaged and the relatively more dynamic areas of the Union. The 
strength of the relationship between the EU Regional Policy and growth 
seems in fact maximised in the already best performing EU regions. 
 
Spatial dependence and spatial panel data analysis 
The main specification of the Regional Growth model presented in the paper 
includes the spatial lags of the key conditioning factors: after their inclusion 
there is no evidence of residual spatial auto-correlation in the regression 
residuals. However, in order to further check the robustness of the proposed 
results, other forms of spatial autocorrelation are controlled for by means of 
alternative specifications of the model. The Spatial Autoregressive (SAR and 
DURBIN) specifications of model (1) account for the spatial dynamics of the 
dependent variable with spatially lagged Y (Spatial lag models) coefficient. 
The Spatial Error Model (SEM) will, instead, account for the dependence 
determining the spatially inter-correlation between the error terms. The 
technical details of these additional estimations are discussed in Appendix 
and Results are reported Table A.4 in the same Appendix. These additional 
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regressions confirm the key results of the analysis: spatial dependence related 
to Y is not statistically significant while signs and significance of the main 
coefficient of interest (Regional Policy) are all confirmed. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The empirical analysis has shed new light on the relationship between 
regional growth and EU expenditure for Regional Policy, Rural Development 
and CAP.  The EU Regional Policy expenditure is associated with stronger 
regional growth rates in all regions. This key result emerges clearly in all 
specifications of the model and is robust to a large number of tests. However, 
the positive influence of the EU Regional Policy is stronger in the regions with 
the most favourable socio-economic environment. This reveals a potential 
paradox of the EU Cohesion policy that works better in the relatively stronger 
(and better performing) regions with comparatively smaller (although still 
positive) gains for the most disadvantaged areas of the Union.  The Rural 
Development policy, that is attracting increasing resources from the 
progressive reduction in funding of the first pillar of the CAP, is not 
systematically linked with regional economic growth. Some positive influence 
of Rural Development funding only emerges in the most advanced and better 
endowed   areas:   the   rural   areas   of   the   ‘core’   of   the   EU   not   the   most  
disadvantaged   and   peripheral.   The   ‘traditional’   agricultural   market-related 
CAP funding has also no direct link with regional growth. However, there is 
no evidence of a counter-treatment effect working against cohesion. 
Conversely, where some modest influence of CAP on growth emerges it is in 
the most disadvantaged areas of the Union (those with less infrastructure and 
less innovation). This result might send an important message on the 
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possibility that traditional top-down policies (such as the CAP) might be 
capable to channel their funds towards the most deprived regions of the 
Union with some positive influence on economic growth. On the contrary the 
complexity of the programming of more bottom-up interventions might lead 
to a concentration of the benefits in stronger areas. Finally, the analysis also 
shows that policy coordination is of paramount importance: returns from the 
EU Regional Policy are maximised where funding from the other policies is 
also concentrated. This confirms the OECD (2009) and Barca Report (2009) 
intuition on the importance of a synergic use of the funds from all EU policies. 
 
Although robust to a large number of tests, some key limitations should be 
borne in mind when interpreting these results. First, regional economic 
growth is not the only outcome of interest for the EU Regional Policy and this 
is even truer for Rural Development and CAP. All these policies produce a 
number of tangible and intangible outcomes (and public goods) that cannot 
be captured by the proposed analysis. Second the analysis is unable to unveil 
causal links: a number of techniques and checks have been adopted to 
minimise any potential bias due to endogeneity but we still this is not a fully 
causal analysis. Third, the  time period covered by the analysis remains 
relatively limited and more data will be need for more long-term analysis. 
The now completely digitalised and harmonised collection of expenditure 
data will make this possible in the near future. 
  
Having acknowledged these limitations it is still possible to make some 
relevant policy considerations based on the results presented in the paper. 
The reinforcement of the local socio-economic environment is a crucial pre-
condition for the success of any regional policy. This is of fundamental 
importance in order to maximise the returns to regional policy expenditure in 
the most deprived areas of the Union. Addressing this potential paradox is 
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even more relevant to Rural Development interventions whose pro-growth 
potential is totally conditioned upon the pre-existing conditions of the target 
areas.  
 
In order to address the structural conditions of the most disadvantaged 
regions purely bottom-up tools might be insufficient. Tailoring the various 
policies to local needs is certainly crucial. However, the analysis of the 
territorial effect of the first pillar of the CAP might be unveiling a relevant 
story: top-down interventions might be very effective in order to channel 
resources to the most deprived areas. Where the institutional context is weak 
and local lobbies might form strong anti-growth coalitions the identification 
of local needs and the planning and implementation of bottom-up actions 
might be problematic. As a consequence it is necessary to carefully assess the 
best mix of bottom-up and top-down interventions to match the conditions of 
the various EU countries and regions. In the same vein a national-level 
coordination and agenda setting might also favour the coordination on the 
ground among the various policies while at the local level conflicts and 
contrasts between the various agencies and offices might make this more 
difficult to achieve.                 
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APPENDIX A – Robustness checks  
A.1 - Robustness Check 1 – Measurement Error in the policy 
variable and Endogeneity 
 
The additional dataset that makes it possible to test for potential 
measurement errors in the policy variable includes actual payments for all 
NUTS-2regions in the EU27 and includes annual Commitments and Payments 
for the EU Regional Policy and Rural Development (together and not 
separable) over the period 2000-2009 only. As customary in the economic 
growth literature the test avoids annual GDP data to measure economic 
growth and relies on 5-year periods (OECD, 2009), annual policy data from 
2000 to 2009 are aligned to this, and the model was estimated as a cross 
section, where regional GDP pro capita growth rate over the period 2007-2009 
is  regressed  onto  the  ‘spatially  targeted’  policies’  payments  over  the  2000-2009 
period. The same model was estimated by making use of Commitment data 
from the previous analysis by linking the regional growth rate of GDP per 
capita over the period 2007-2009   with   ‘spatially   targeted’   policies’  
Commitments for the last two programming periods (2000-2006 and 2007-
2013) in order to maximise comparability. 
  
The results of the model estimated on both datasets are shown in Table A.1 
below. In particular, the first column of the table shows the results obtained 
by running the model on the main dataset of the analysis (and as a 
consequence policy data refer to the whole period of Commitments). The 
second column shows the corresponding results obtained by running the 
model on the actual payments dataset. Finally, column 3 sets out the results 
obtained by considering Payments as endogenous and, consequently, 
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instrumented by the corresponding Commitments an Instrumental Variable 
framework.  
 
The   check   conducted   on   the  main   dataset   confirms   the   impact   of   ‘spatially  
targeted’   policies11 on   regional   growth:   i.e.   the   coefficient   of   the   ‘spatially  
targeted’  policies  is  positive  and  significant. The policy variable coefficient in 
column 2 is positive but not significant. However, once the endogeneity of 
actual payment is accounted for in column 3 by means of an appropriate IV 
strategy the key results of the paper are confirmed. In addition the results of 
this IV analysis confirm that the key conclusions of the paper are robust to 
endogeneity bias. 
 
Table A.1 - Measurement Error in the Policy Variable and Endogeneity Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  1 - OLS 2 - OLS 3 - IV Spatially Targeted Policies 0.0004*** (0.000) 0.00001 (0.000) 0.000001* (0.000) Constant -0.732*** (0.1563) -0.026*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.003) N of Regions R-squared Prob>F 
139 0.149 0.000 
198 0.170 0.000 
198 0.170 0.000 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.2 - Robustness Check 2 – Measurement Error in the outcome 
variable  
  
Table A-2.a - Measurement Error in the outcome variable (Total EU Expenditure) Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  1 2 Total EU Funding 0.0093* (0.0047) 0.0042 (0.0034) Ln of initial GDP p.c. -0.1484*** (0.0270) -0.1493*** (0.0284) Social Filter Index  0.0014 (0.0040) -0.0038 (0.0037) R&D Activities 0.0030 (0.0051) 0.0020 (0.0044) Infrastructural endowment 0.2808 (0.3082) -0.0188 (0.3340) Spatially Lagged Social Filter   0.0046  (0.0041) Spatially lagged R&D Activities  0.0225*** (0.0037) Spatially lagged Infrastructure  0.1500 (0.5357) National Growth Rate 0.0356*** (0.0050) 0.0410*** (0.0046) Krugman Index 0.0010 (0.0082) -0.0020 (0.0092) Population Density 0.0001** (0.0000) 0.0001** (0.0000) Constant 1.3974*** (0.2636) 1.3861*** (0.2751) Obs R squared  Prob>F 
242 0.870 0.000 
242 0.899 0.000 Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10       
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Table A.2.b -  Measurement Error in the outcome variable (Regional Policy, Rural Development 
Policy and CAP). Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  1 2 3 4 5 Regional Policy 0.0277*** (0.0066) 0.0223** (0.0091) 0.0038*** (0.0085) 0.0355*** (0.0070) 0.0003 (0.0206) Rural Development Policy 0.0093 (0.0085) 0.0031 (0.0066) -0.0028 (0.0113) -0.0078 (0.0120) 0.0412** (0.0201) CAP -0.0198***  (0.0056) -0.0115* (0.0068) -0.0120  (0.0095) -0.0173 (0.0070) -0.0303*** (0.0089) Social Filter Index*Regional Policy  -0.0128**  (0.0054)    Social Filter Index*Rural Development Policy  0.0215* (0.0115)    Social Filter Index*CAP  -0.0048* (0.0026)    R&D Activities*Regional Policy   -0.0096 (0.0085)   R&D Activities*Rural Development Policy   0.0104 (0.0083)   R&D Activities*CAP   -0.0055 (0.0057)   Infrastructure*Regional Policy    -1.2217*** (0.3197)  Infrastructure*Rural Development Policy    1.7491*** (0.4157)  Infrastructure*CAP    -1.4444*** (0.2981)  Regional Policy* Rural Development Policy     0.0145 (0.0221) Regional Policy*CAP     0.0111** (0.0051) Rural Development Policy*CAP     -0.0187 (0.0133) 
Log	  of	  Initial	  GDP,	  ‘Territorial	  
Conditioning	  Factors’,	  	  
‘Spatially	  Lagged	  terms’	  ,	  Controls and constant X X X X X Period Dummies X X X X X Obs  R squared  Prob>F 
242 0.919 0.000 
242 0.927 0.000 
242 0.921 0.000 
242 0.939 0.000 
242 0.924 0.000 Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - The	   log	   of	   initial	   GDP,	   ‘territorial	  
conditioning	  factors’	  (Social	  Filter	  Index,	  R&D	  Activities,	  Infrastructural	  endowment	  Spatially	  Lagged	  Social	  Filter,	  Spatially lagged R&D Activities, Spatially lagged infrastructure) and the same control variables (Constant; National Growth Rate; Krugman Index and Population Density) reported in Table 2.a are included in all regressions but not reported in the table.  
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A.3 - Robustness Check 3 – Misspecification of the model and 
linearity: Quantile Regression analysis 
  
This Robustness Check is based on Quantile Regression (QR) Techniques. As 
discussed in the paper QR has a number of advantages over standard linear 
regression analysis. However, when QR is combined with Fixed Effect panel 
data in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity constant over time (a 
primary concern in a policy assessment framework), its identification and 
estimation become very complex (Kato, Galvao and Monte Rojas, 2012). In 
particular, when the number of observations on each individual/region is 
limited on account of the limited number of available time periods, it is 
difficult to allow for the effect of an individual FE to change across quantiles 
in the same way as we can allow for the effects of the X covariates. This 
difficulty stems from the fact that the standard methods used to cancel out FE 
are no longer applicable: the quantile of the difference in general is not equal 
to   the   difference   in   quantiles   but   instead   become   ‘intractable   objects’  
(Ponomareva, 2011). 
 
Most of the literature that studies QR models for panel data with FE tries to 
deal with this difficulty by assuming that the number of periods t reaches 
infinity with sample size n and then considers individual heterogeneity a 
“pure   locations   shift   effect”  on   conditional  quantiles   (Canay,   2010;  Koenker,  
2005) or by allowing it to vary across quantiles (Galvao, 2008). Instead, in 
relation to a relatively short panel, an attempt to estimate QR has been made 
by applying correlated random coefficients model (Abrevaya and Dahl, 2008), 
or by focusing on the identification of the coefficients for a single conditional 
quantile restriction rather than on the whole set of quantiles (Rosen, 2009) or 
even by estimating the moment of the conditional distribution of either 
continuous or discrete covariates (Ponomareva, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, most empirical QR applications prefer a cross-section 
framework for analysis (Buchinsky, 1994; Powell, 2011; Powell and Wagner, 
2011). The robustness check proposed here proceeds accordingly. In 
particular, pooled OLS models that regress the regional growth rate at time t 
on the policy and on the other usual covariates at time t-1 are implemented: 
the average annual growth rate over the period 2007-2009 (computed as in 
Section 5.2) is regressed onto the Regional Policy Commitments and onto the 
other covariates related to the 2000-2006 period and the average annual 
growth rate over the period 2000-2003 is regressed onto the Regional Policy 
Commitments and other covariates related to the period 1994-1999. As stated 
earlier, QR analysis focuses on the 0.10, 0.50 and 0.75 quantiles of the Y 
distribution. 
 
Table A.3 - Quantile Regression   Quantile 0.10 Quantile 0.50 Quantile 0.75 Mean regression Dependent variable: average regional GDP growth rate 2007-2009           Initial condition -0.055 (0.0677) 0.032 (0.0273) 0.006  (0.0058) -0.000 (0.0088) 0.003  (0.0055) -0.001 (0.0092) 0.000 (0.0127) 0.0001 (0.0149) Regional Policy 0.00002 (0.0000) 0.000002 (0.0000) 0.000006** (0.0000) 0.000005 (0.0000) 0.000005** (0.0000) 0.000007 (0.0000) 0.00001* (0.0000) 0.00001 (0.0000) Covariates* No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Dependent variable: average regional GDP growth rate 2000-2003           Initial condition -0.007 (0.0139) -0.014 (0.0122) -0.002 (0.0059) -0.015** (0.0066) -0.009 (0.0064) -0.009 (0.0087) -0.003 (0.0047) -0.007 (0.0057) Regional Policy 0.0000051 (0.0000) -0.000004 (0.0000) 
0.00001*** (0.0000) 0.00001** (0.0000) 0.000009** (0.0000) 0.00001* (0.0000) .00001*** (0.0000) 0.00001** (0.0000) 
Covariates * No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
*Covariates	  included	  in	  the	  model	  are	  the	  Control	  variables	  plus	  those	  one	  related	  to	  the	  “Territory”	  (Social	  Filter	  
Index,	   R&D	  Activities	   and	   Infrastructural	   endowment)	   and	   to	   the	   “Policy”	   (Rural	   Development	   Policy	   and	   CAP)	  Subsystem . ** Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.4 - Robustness Check 4 – Spatial Heterogeneity and Spatial 
Panel Data Analysis  
The recent spatial econometrics literature has identified three different types 
of interaction effects that could affect local economic phenomena and 
consequently their analysis: endogenous interaction effects linked to the 
dependent variable (Y), exogenous interaction effects among independent 
variables (X) of the units of analysis, and interaction effects among error 
terms. Hitherto, by inserting spatially-lagged independent variables 
(spatially-lagged variables matrix) into the key model specification the 
regressions only included controls for the second types of these spatial 
interactions. However, the analysis implemented in the paper has not yet 
fully controlled for the spatial dependence of the dependent variable and 
error terms. These forms of spatial dependence can be treated in a panel data 
framework. By accounting for the unobservable spatial and time-period 
specific effects, the panel data and spatial econometric literatures offer a 
common setting, enabling us to account for the cross-sectional and state 
dependence of the Y and the Xs, while at the same time controlling for 
unknown heterogeneity. We can also account for them simultaneously 
through   ‘Spatial  Dynamics   Panel  Data  Models’   (SDPDM).   Such  models   can  
easily identify the dynamic responses over time and space of the space-time 
diffusion of policy impacts through cross-partial derivatives related to 
changes in the explanatory variables and in the dependent variables (Elhrost, 
2005). Once the need to account for spatial dynamics has been identified, the 
most serious issue seems to be the identification, among the Spatial Panel 
Data Models, of that model that can best capture and represent the spatial 
dependence of the data. Some analyses of European regional convergence 
processes have found evidence of model misspecification if the spatial 
interdependencies of regional growth are ignored. The most common 
Riccardo Crescenzi and Mara Giua 
   44 
approaches that address the issue of spatial dependence (Anselin, 2006) 
adopted  in  the  existing  literature  refer  to  ‘spatial  error  autocorrelation’  (Arbia  
and  Piras,  2009)  and  ‘spatial  lag’  models.  The  latter,  often  considered  a  spatial  
autoregressive model, would seem to be more appropriate for quantifying 
how   a   region’s   growth   rate   is   affected   by   the   growth   rate   in   surrounding  
regions (Anselin, 2006). The addition of a spatially-lagged dependent variable 
(‘spatial   lag;   models),   however,   causes   simultaneity   and   endogeneity 
problems that GMM (Badinger et al., 2004) and maximum likelihood (Elhorst, 
2005) methods can address12. As in classical panel data literature, a fixed-
effects model is largely preferred (Elhrost, 2005) because the unobserved 
component is allowed to depend on the other regressors included in the 
model.  
 
Within this FE spatial panel data framework, this section extends the main 
analysis of the paper by allowing the model (1) to account, in addition to the 
spatial dependence of the Xs, for Y and for error-term dependencies. For this 
purpose, model (1) will assume three additional specifications (SAR, DURBIN 
and SEM) and the results provided by the estimation (via maximum 
likelihood) of each of them will be analysed in a comparative sense in order to 
a) decide the best way to model the spatial dependence of the phenomena 
analysed and b) test if the results of the main analysis are robust, given the 
overall spatial dependence of the phenomena under analysis. 
 
In this manner the Spatial Autoregressive (SAR and DURBIN) specifications 
of model (1) will account for the spatial dynamics of the dependent variable 
that estimates the spatially lagged Y (Spatial lag models) coefficient. The                                                         12 In this sense, a variety of estimators have been recently proposed by the literature: Yu et al. (2008) and Lee and Yu (2010) provide the asymptotic properties of a quasi-maximum likelihood for an SDPD model with exogenous explanatory variables. More recently, Korniotis (2010) proposed a solution based on the Least Square Dummy Variable and instrumental methods (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982) extended to allow for the spatial effect. 
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Spatial Error Model (SEM) will, instead, account for the dependence 
determining the spatially inter-correlation between the error terms (LeSage & 
Pace, 2009). Among the Spatial Autoregressive models, DURBIN could be 
understood as a special case of SAR as besides including the spatially lagged 
Y it also includes other exogenous spatially-lagged regressors. The choice of 
the regressors is uncostrained: both Xs and additional variables could be 
inserted in their spatial lag version. On the basis of the results reported in the 
literature, the DURBIN version of the model is considered the most 
appropriate   and   informative   for   regional   analysis   insofar   as   it   is   a   “Spatial  
lag”   specification   that,  moreover,  makes   it   possible   to   control   for  Xs   spatial  
dependence (LeSage & Pace, 2009). 
 
As already seen for the previous robustness checks, both   the  data’s   and   the  
model’s   structure   needs   to  be   adjusted   to   take  due  account  of   the   setting   in  
which the robustness check is to be performed, which, in this case, is the 
framework provided by the spatial panel data model.  
 
In this sense, the panel was reset to comprise two periods: for the first period 
the independent variables refer to the first period of the main analysis (policy 
programming period 1994-99) whereas the dependent variable is the GDP 
Growth rate in the second period of the main analysis (2000-06). For the 
second period, the data used for the regressors refer to the period 2000-06 
whereas the outcome variable is that used in the third period of the main 
analysis (2007-13). By performing the analysis on such a panel, we deploy 
explanatory variables with a one-period-lag with respect to the dependent 
variable, even if the SPDM framework lags prevents us from taking lags 
directly into account in estimating a model.  
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Results from the SAR, DURBIN and SEM models, presented in Table A.4 
below, refer to the version of model (1) estimated by considering Regional 
Policy, Rural Development Policy and CAP separately. The estimated models 
includes all regional conditioning factors, spatially lagged terms and controls 
included in the main results presented in Tables 2 and 3 of the paper.  The 
analysis   was   carried   out   by   implementing   the   STATA   routine   “XSMLE”  
(Hughes,  Mortari   and   Belotti,   forthcoming)   and   using   a   “Rook   Contiguity”  
matrix as a spatial weight. 
 
Table A.4 shows that the spatially lagged Y coefficient is never significant. 
Spatial influences on regional growth rates seem to be fully accounted for by 
the spatial correlation among the explanatory values (already included in the 
main specification of the model reported in tables 2 and 3 in the paper) while 
the endogenous spatial dependence in terms of Y seems to be irrelevant. This 
robustness check highlights that the main analysis has already accounted for 
the overall spatial dependence characterising regional growth. Even by 
accounting for the additional and potentially strong source of spatial 
dependence related to Y, the results obtained by the main model do not 
change. The findings on the main coefficient of interest (Regional Policy) are 
all confirmed. Moreover, the signs of the other explanatory variables are also 
generally confirmed, albeit with a different level of significance.  
 
The results from the three different models (SAR, DURBIN and SEM) are 
coherent with each other. For each variable the coefficients used always have 
the same signs.  By making comparisons between them, the different ways of 
modelling spatial dependence are shown to lead to similar conclusions. The 
SEM model, which accounts for the spatial dependence affecting the 
regression’s  residuals,  leads  to  very  similar  results  with  respect  to  those  (SAR  
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and DURBIN) provided by directly accounting for the spatial dependence of 
Y.  
 
Table A.4 - Spatial Panel data models Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  SAR DURBIN SEM Spatially lagged Y -0.139646  (0.1807) -0.1973682 (0.1630)  Ln of initial GDP p.c. 0.0706273  (0.1041) 0.1195099* (0.0677) 0.076037 (0.0617) Regional Policy 0.0001165**  (0.0000) 0.0001183*** (0.0000) 0.0001288*** (0.0000) Rural Development Policy 0.0000284  (0.0000) 0.0000352  (0.0000) 0.0000141 (0.0000) CAP -0.0000312  (0.0000) -0.0000361  (0.0000) -0.0000378 (0.0000) Social Filter Index -0.01765  (0.0143) -0.0177591  (0.0112) -0.0160019 (0.0109) R&D Activities 0.0378418  (0.0309) 0.0390929** (0.0193) 0.0321667* (0.0189) Infrastructural endowment 2.713875* (1.4307) 3.237553** (1.3450) 2.989705**  (1.3417) Spatially lagged Social Filter Index  -0.0610526* (0.0372)  Spatially lagged R&D Activities  -0.1299134  (0.1006)  Spatially lagged Infrastructure  4.652283 (6.1640)  National Growth Rate 0.1716416*** (0.0231) 0.1646388*** (0.0128) 0.1663109*** (0.0122) Krugman Index 0.1649753*** (0.0501) 0.1686406*** (0.0317) 0.1768534*** (0.0319) Population Density 0.0000243*** (0.0000) 0.0000231*** (0.0000) 0.000027*** (0.0000) Obs  R squared 242 0.157 242 0.108 242 0.144 ** Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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APPENDIX B – Computation of the Social Filter Index 
 
Table B.1 Principal component Analysis. Eigen analysis of the Correlation Matrix. Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative Component 1 2.35352 1.37195 0.5884 0.5884 Component 2 0.981569 0.319494 0.2454 0.8338 Component 3 0. 662075 0.659236 0.1655 0.9993 Component 4 0. 002839 - 0.0007 1.0000   
Table B.2 Principal component Analysis. Principal Components' Coefficients. Variable Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Agricultural share of employment -0.3963 0.4757 0.7852 -0.0094 Long term unemployment -0.3132 0.7339 -0.6026 0.0105 Human Capital 0.6103 0.3407 0.1101 0.7066 Skilled labour force 0.6102 0.3449 0.0905 -0.7074 
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